Employee Repudiation of Bargaining Representatives: An Appraisal of Existing Restrictions by unknown
EMPLOYEE REPUDIATION OF BARGAINING
REPRESENTATIVES: AN APPRAISAL OF
EXISTING RESTRICTIONS
SECTION seven of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees employees
the right to choose their own bargaining representative.1 This right is exer-
cisable by majority vote,2 ascertained either by informal count 3 or in an elec-
tion conducted by the National Labor Relations Board.4 If a majority of em-
ployees chooses a union, the union will be the exclusive represedtative for all
employees, with power to negotiate a contract binding on all. If a majority is
opposed to unionism or cannot agree upon a particular union, the employees
may deal individually with their employer. 6
1. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
* . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ..
49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
2. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952). The voting unit is
the "appropriate bargaining unit," which may be defined on a single craft, plant, employer
or multiple-employer basis. Cox, LABOR LAw 325-34 (3d ed. 1954). Initial power to
determine which unit is appropriate for bargaining, and hence for elections, is vested
in the National Labor Relations Board, but its determination may be judicially reviewed
in proceedings before a United States Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce an order to
bargain. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 154 (1941); Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 146 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886 (1945).
3. NLRB v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 189 F.2d 582, 586 (6th Cir. 1951) (count of
union application cards) ; NLRB v. Somerset Shoe Co., 111 F.2d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1940)
(same); 2 TEIER, LA3OR DISPUTES AND COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING § 326, at 872-73
(1940). An employer acts at his peril in refusing to recognize a union that claims to
have been selected by a majority of employees of an appropriate bargaining unit, even
though no determination or designation has been made by the Board. The refusal to
recognize is an unfair labor practice unless the employer can show that in the exercise
of reasonable judgment he lacked knowledge of the appropriateness of the unit or of the
selection by a majority of his employees. NLRB v. Piqua Munising Wood Products Co.,
109 F2d 552, 556 (6th Cir. 1940).
4. A petition for election may be filed pursuant to § 9(c) (1) by employer, employees
or union. If presented by union or employees, it must allege that the employees wish to
be represented and the employer refuses to recognize their choice, or that the currently
recognized or certified union has lost majority support. If filed by the employer, the
petition must allege that the employer is beset with conflicting claims to recognition.
The Board investigates each petition and, upon a finding that a question of representation
affecting interstate commerce exists, directs an election by secret ballot. 49 STAT. 452
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1952); 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.52-102.66 (Supp.
1955) (procedural rules for elections).
5. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952) ; Medo Photo Supply
Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-85 (1944); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332
(1944); Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 254 Ala. 620, 625, 49 So. 2d 214, 218 (1950).
6. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to treat a union selected by only
a minority of employees as exclusive bargaining representative for all employees. E.g.,
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Protection of the right to a bargaining arrangement of one's own choosing,
however, is not the principal policy of the National Labor Relations Act. The
act expressly states that industrial harmony is its major goal; freedom of
choice is guaranteed because it is conducive to that end. 7 The history of indus-
trial relations demonstrated that refusals of employers to recognize indepen-
dent unions and the often concomitant insistence on company-dominated unions
were major causes of strikes.8 The guarantee of free choice of bargaining
representation was intended as an antidote to these evils. 9
Frequent change of unions, however, may defeat industrial harmony by
preventing an employer from reaching or maintaining a working agreement
with his employees. Therefore, although the act as originally passed contained
no express limitation on employees' freedom of choice, the Board has sought
to keep means subordinated to ends by limiting employees' right to repudiate
a bargaining representative selected by them. Two rules, known as the certifi-
cation year and contract bar rules, embody these limitations. In 1947 Congress
adopted an additional, and in many respects overlapping, restriction on free
choice: the election year rule.10
Although these limitations subserve the immediate objective of stabilizing
union representation, this Comment will question their contribution to the ulti-
mate goal of industrial harmony. First the Comment will describe the operation
of the rules. Next it will show that not all applications of the rules can be
justified in terms of industrial stability. The Comment will conclude that logic
NLRB v. Henry Heide, Inc., 219 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 90
N.L.R.B. 1403, 1416 (1950) ; Blossom Products Corp., 20 N.L.R.B. 335, 348-49 (1940).
However, such a union may serve as bargaining agent for its members. NLRB v. Reliable
Newspaper Delivery, Inc., 187 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614,
1618 (1950).
7. Section 1 outlines congressional findings that denial by employers of the right to
organize has led to strikes and industrial unrest, and declares that the policy of the United
States is to eliminate such causes by "protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing."
49 STAT. 449-50 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952). Section 7 guarantees the
right of free choice. See note 1 supra.
8. Bow, INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
Act 2-3 (1940). Senator Wagner, the author of the act, stated:
"Again and again they [investigating commissions] found that the denial of
labor's right to be heard in the councils of industry N as the root cause of the in-
dustrial struggle. Again and again, they found that the recognition of this right
was the only sure basis for industrial peace and the rational conduct of business
affairs."
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 5 (1939). These sentiments are embodied in § 1 of the act. See note 7 supra.
9. See notes 7, 8 supra. The guarantee is implemented in § 8(a) (5), making it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with the majority-designated
union. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1952).
10. 61 STAT. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1952), amending 49 STAT. 453
(1935). See note 17 in!ra and accompanying text.
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should lead to some relaxation of the rules; empirical study by the Board
might result in further loosening.
THE CERTIFICATION AND ELECTION YEAR RULES
The certification year rule immunizes a union elected as a bargaining agent
from rapid repudiation. The rule bars all elections for one year from the
date a union is certified as winner of an election conducted by the Board or
other impartial body." Moreover, during the year informal balloting cannot
be used to challenge the union's right to act as exclusive bargaining agent. Thus
the Supreme Court has held that an employer committed an unfair labor prac-
tice by not bargaining with a certified union, even though seventy percent of
his employees had informed him that they had repudiated the union as their
bargaining agent.' 2
Before 1947 the certification year rule did admit of certain exceptions, allow-
ing repudiation of a union under unusual circumstances. The Board would
hold elections if one of the following conditions were met: the bargaining unit
had changed significantly through the addition or reduction of crafts or work-
ers ;13 the certified union was defunct ;'4 a schism had occurred in the certified
11. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., LAB. RmL. REP. (38 L.R.R.M. 1099) (NLRB
June 6, 1956) (election supervised by state labor board) ; Rockwell Valves, Inc., LAB.
REt. REP. (37 L.R.R.M. 1271) (NLRB Jan. 27, 1956); Centr-O-Cast & Engineering Co.,
100 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1952). The Supreme Court approved the rule in Brooks v. NLRB,
348 U.S. 96 (1954). Certification consists of a statement by the Board that a union was
elected bargaining representative.
The certification year rule xias first introduced in 1937, National Sugar Refining Co.,
4 N.L.R.B. 276 (1937), and its term was fixed at one year in 1938, Todd-Johnson Dry
Dock, Inc., 10 N.L.R.B. 629, 632 (1938). The New York State Labor Relations Board,
administering an act patterned after the National Labor Relations Act, has adopted the
certification year rule. F. T. Ham Constr. Co., 14 N.Y.S.L.R.B. 83 (1951); New York
Labor Board v. L. Morales & Sons, Inc., 113 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1951). Other states
with similar acts have included a certification year rule in their statutes. E.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 179.16(2) (Supp. 1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.7(c) (Purdon Supp.
1955).
On the doctrinal level the rule has been regarded as creating a conclusive presumption
(f the continuance of majority support. NLRB v. Globe Atomatic Sprinkler Co., 199 F.2d
(4 (3d Cir. 1952).
12. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954), 69 HAgv. L. REv. (1955). The Court
reasoned that the Board must have the power to make its certification year rule effective
against employers as well as against employees. Otherwise the employer would be allowed
to assert the rights of his employees at a time when they could not directly assert those
rights themselves under the certification year rule. Brooks overruled a number of appellate
court decisions holding that the employer could question the authority of a certified union
during the certification year. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 613
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953) ; NLRB v. Vulcan Forging Co., 188 F.2d 927
(6th Cir. 1951).
13. Aluminum Co. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1943); Electric Sprayit Co., 67
N.L.R.B. 7,0 (1946). Generally a mere increase or decrease in the number employed
is not sufficient to bring the exception into play. There must be other changes as well,
such as a material change in processes or operations. Electric Sprayit Co., supra.
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union and each of two factions claimed to be the exclusive elected representa-
tive of the workers. 15 In each of these situations the certified union was con-
sidered unlikely to be able to negotiate a rational collective bargaining agree-
ment. Hence giving the certified union security would contribute nought to
industrial stability.-6
Most of the significance of the policy-oriented exceptions to the certification
year rule was erased in 1947 by the enactment of the election year rule.17 This
rule absolutely prohibits the Board from holding more than one election every
twelve months. What meaning the exceptions now have is solely attributable
to the fact that the certification year and election year are not coterminous.
The certification year begins only after all disputes over the way an election
has been conducted are settled,' 8 while the election year runs from the date of
The changing character of a unit is also relevant in determining whether to hold the
first election. Confronted with the desiderata of giving employees immediate representa-
tion and certifying a union that can satisfy the workers' needs, the Board has at various
times experimented with three different approaches: (1) not holding an election if a
more representative one can be held within a short time, Harnischfeger Corp., 66 N.L.R.B.
252 (1946) ; (2) holding a Westinghouse election: union is certified but new election
may be held within certification year, Westinghouse Elec. Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 404 (1942) ;
(3) holding a regular election if the unit is fairly representative, Aluminum Co. of America,
supra. The Board can no longer hold a Westinghouse election; where such an election
would have been held, the Board now directs an immediate election. Western Elec. Co.,
76 N.L.R.B. 400 (1948).
14. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 325 (1944). Unions rarely dissolve
during the certification year. As a result the defunct union exception has been applied
mainly to avoid the contract bar rule, and it is in these cases that the term "defunct" has
been given its definition. See note 47 infra.
15. Jasper Wood Products Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1947); Carson Pirie Scott Co.,
69 N.L.R.B. 935 (1946) ; Brightwater Paper Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1102 (1944). For discus-
sion of the history and meaning of the exception, see notes 49-55 infra and accompanying
text.
16. Changed unit exception: Any significant change, through the addition or reduction
of crafts or through a substantial increase or decrease in the working force, was thought
to make the certified union unrepresentative and hence unable to negotiate a contract
satisfactory to all. See Electric Sprayit Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 780 (1946).
Defunct union exception: Denying an election after the certified union had become
defunct would cause instability because there would be no union to represent the workers'
interest and negotiate a collective agreement. See Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 59
N.L.R.B. 325 (1944).
Schism exception: A schism creates a doubt as to the identity of the union chosen
by the employees. Until that doubt is resolved industrial relations remain at a standstill.
See Carson Pirie Scott Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 935 (1946).
17. Section 9(c) (3) provides: "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit
or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election
shall have been held." 61 STAT. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1952), amending
49 STAT. 453 (1935). Where the original election fails to produce a majority for either a
union or individual bargaining, and at least two unions were on the ballot, one run-off
election may be held. 29 C.F.R. § 102.62 (Supp. 1955).




balloting.19 Therefore the only opportunity for applying an exception comes
when an election is demanded after the expiration of the election year but
before the end of the certification year.2 0 This period ranges from one week to
six months or more.
21
Neither the certification nor the election year rules forestall the repudiation
of bargaining representatives who have been selected informally.2 2 Both rules
bar change only after selection has been made through a formal election. The
freedom of choice this limitation appears to preserve is illusory, however. Any
union that fears loss of employee support in the ensuing year may, and undoubt-
edly will, seek an election from the Board. And the Board will hold elections
even though the only reason is to give the union the protection of the certifi-
cation year rule.2
CONTRACt BAR RULE
The certification and election year rules afford a union at least one year
of security. The union may extend this period by executing a collective bar-
gaining agreement. That event brings into play the contract bar rule, pre-
venting any change in representation during the life of a contract of reasonable
duration,24 or, if the contract is deemed to be of inordinate length, for a reason-
19. Palmer Mfg. Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 336 (1953); Fruitvale Canning Co., 85 N.L.R.B.
684 (1949).
20. This opportunity presented itself in Aleo Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1297, 1302 n.18
(1954) (election denied because the requisites of the schism exception were not met) and
Swift & Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 917 (1951) (election directed because of the existence of a
valid schism).
21. For examples of certifications issued within the week after an election, see NLRB
Press Release, No. W-473, Oct. 17, 1956, pp. 9-10. For examples of certifications issued
over six months after an election, see Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1405
(1953); Kennecott Copper Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1391 (1953).
22. NLRB v. Raeder Motor Co., 202 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1953) (union designated by
show of membership cards repudiated shortly afterward); NLRB v. Mayer, 196 F.2d
286 (5th Cir. 1952) (same).
23. General Box Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 678 (1949). The petitioning union must show
that it has been designated by at least thirty percent of the employees to obtain an election.
Usually a membership list is sufficient proof. Cox, LABOR LAw 307-08 (3d ed. 1954). See
29 C.F.R. § 101.17(a) (1949).
24. Kellog & Sons, Inc., LAB. REL. REP. (37 L.R.R.M. 1426) (NLRB March 19,
1956); General Motors Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1140 (1953); Saginaw Furniture Shops,
Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1488 (1952).
The rule was adopted in 1938. Superior Elec. Products Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 19 (1938).
Earlier the Board had refused to allow a contract to suspend the right of free choice.
New England Transp. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 130, 138-39 (1936): "The whole process of col-
lective bargaining and unrestricted choice of representatives assumes the freedom of the
employees to change their representatives, while at the same time continuing the existing
agreements under which the representatives must function."
Traditionally, the Board denied the bar rule to contracts signed after a rival union
had filed an election petition. The Grace Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1947). Recently, how-
ever, the Board ruled that a contract executed after a rival union filed an election petition,
but before it notified the employer of its claim to representative status is entitled to
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able period. 25 Unlike the certification and election year rules, the bar of a
contract applies whether the contracting union was selected by election or by
informal balloting.
20
The contract bar rule is in a state of growth. Controversies have developed
over what is a reasonable length, what constitutes an adequate contract, and
what circumstances justify withholding the bar. In each of these areas recent
Board decisions indicate a clear policy of increasing the protection afforded a
contracting union.
Period of Bar
The "reasonable" period of time during which a contract will bar a change of
union has steadily been expanded. Before 1947 a contract could generally
bar an election for only one year.27 In this experimental era of labor relations,
contracts of greater length were thought to be incapable of providing stability.2s
In 1947, however, two years became the ordinary period.29 Experience had
demonstrated that two-year contracts could stabilize relations, if the negotiat-
ing union was left in charge of the grievance procedure. 30 In 1953 the Board
further extended the period by ruling that five-year contracts, when adopted
by a substantial portion of an industry, would bar any change for their full
duration.31
the protection of the bar. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., LAB. REL. REP. (38 L.R.R.M. 1193)
(NLRB July 23, 1956).
New York also has the contract bar rule. Suffridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup.
Ct. 1948). Pennsylvania has a hybrid form. A new union may be certified during the
life of an existing contract for the sole purpose of negotiating a contract which will take
effect upon the expiration of the old agreement. The repudiated union will remain in
charge of the old agreement. P.R.T. Employees Union v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board, 51 Pa. D. & C. 47 (C.P. 1943).
25. Supreme Sunrise Food Exchange, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 918 (1953) ; The Mennen
Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 677 (1953); San Francisco Retailers Council, 90 N.L.R.B. 1803 (1950).
26. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1013 (1950); United States Time Corp.,
79 N.L.R.B. 1135 (1948).
27. The A. S. Abell Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1414, 1416 (1945); The Trailer Co., 51 N.L.R.B.
1106, 1109 (1943); Inland Container Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 952, 954 (1943). However,
contracts of two-year duration were permissible if customary in the industry. Owens-
Illinois Pac. Coast Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 990 (1941); Inland Container Corp., supra (dictum).
28. In The Trailer Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 1106 (1943), the Board, in permitting an election
after one year although the contract was to run for duration of war, stated that denying
an election would serve to "aggravate rather than minimize discord and to remove the
foundation on which stability can be based." Id. at 1111. In Reed Roller Bit Co., 72
N.L.R.B. 927 (1947), in extending the permissible duration to two years, the Board
said that it had permitted elections every year previously because collective bargaining
was in a stage of trial and error. Id. at 930.
29. Puritan Ice Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1947); Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 N.L.R.B.
927 (1947). The Board had begun to relax its requirements in 1945 by holding that
two-year contracts would be deemed reasonable unless shown to be contrary to a well
established custom in the industry. Uxbridge Worsted Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 1395 (1945).
30. See cases cited note 29 supra.




The Board has also enlarged the category of contracts to which the bar will
apply. Originally, for the bar to operate a contract had to be legally enforce-
able and broad enough to cover most conditions of employment.32 Recent
Board decisions do not insist upon these requirements. If there is evidence
of good labor relations generally, the contract will bar a change of union.
33
Thus the Board in Rohmrn & Haas 3 4 held that a contract terminable at will
barred an election for two years. And in Nash Kelvinator 35 the Board gave
similar effect to a contract providing only for wage rates. Extrinsic evidence
in each case convinced the Board of the harmonious relationship between the
parties.3
0
sible in the automobile industry); Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 389 (1955)
(same in farm equipment manufacturing industry) ; Royal Jet, Inc., LAB. RFL. REP. (36
L.R.R.M. 1477) (NLRB Aug. 25, 1955) (three-year contract bar permissible in the air-
craft industry, but contracting union failed to meet the burden of showing that it was
in that industry) ; Home Curtain Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. 336 (1955) (three year contracts
permissible in the curtain industry. For a history and discussion of the Board's treatment
of duration problems, see Lahne, The Duration of Labor Agreements and the Contract
Bar Doctrine of the N.L.R.B., 5 SYRncusE L. REv. 146 (1954). There is a trend away
from the five-year agreement in the automobile industry. Recently Ford and General
Motors, after experimenting with five-year contracts, shifted to three-year agreements.
See Agreement between General Motors Corp. and UAW-CIO, BNA COI.ECrIVE BAR-
GAINI1,,G NEGOTIATIONS AND CoNTRACTs 20:301 (1955); Agreement between Ford Motor
Co. and UAW-CIO, id. at 20:401.
A substantial portion of an oligopolistic industry is likely to be bound by contracts of
equal length because generally a single union represents the employees of all companies
and pattern bargaining with the individual companies is customary. See, e.g., Business
Week, June 9, 1956, p. 29 (steel industry). Such contracts are also the norm in competitive
industries which bargain as a unit with labor. See, e.g., Contract between Merchants'
Ladies' Garment Ass', Inc. and ILGWU-AFL, BNA CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEoTIA-
TIONS AND CoNTRAcTs 23:1 (1955).
32. A contract terminable at will could not bar an election. Mid-Continent Coal
Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 261 (1949); Pontosi Tie & Lumber Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 590 (1947);
Iona Desk Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 1522 (1945). Nor could a contract which required further
ratification by union members. American Broadcasting Co., LAB. REL. REP. (36 L.R.R.M.
1494) (NLRB Aug. 31, 1955). A contract also had to provide the substantive terms of
employment in order to act as a bar. A. 0. Smith Corp., 78 N.L.R.B. 1050 (1948)
(wage agreement is not sufficient) ; Standard Oil Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1944) (agree-
nient not sufficient which only provided for recognition and handling of grievances);
Wilmington Terminal Warehouse Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 299 (1946) (by implication). See
al;o Eicor, Inc., 46 N.L.R.B. 1035 (1943) (contract must be reduced to writing).
33. See authorities cited in notes 34, 35 infra. See also Phelps Dodge Refining Corp.,
112 N.L.R.B. 1209, 1212 (1955): "Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the contract
w%'as not ratified in accordance with Intervenor's constitution, the record shows that the
contract was nevertheless put into effect and that the formality of ratification was not
necessary to stabilize bargaining relations."
34. 108 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1954).
35. 110 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
36. In Rohm & Haas the Board said:
"That the former rule governing contracts terminable at will would have the
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Vestiges of the old view remain, however. Under prior requirements, long-
term contracts allowing broad renegotiation at the end of one year or pro-
viding for automatic annual renewal unless expressly terminated by a party
at the end of each year barred elections for only one year.3 7 Although these
contracts are no less binding than contracts terminable at will, the Board still
refuses to allow them to bar for longer than a year.38 No justification has been
advanced for this differential treatment.39 Two out of five members of the
Board have advocated allowing contracts with broad renegotiation clauses to
bar for two years.40 A third member appears to be yielding to their logic. 41
If contracts with broad renegotiation clauses are held to bar for two or more
years, establishment of a similar rule for automatic renewal contracts should
follow as a matter of course.
42
The shift in emphasis from the comprehensiveness and enforceability of a
collective bargaining agreement to the stability effected by the collective bar-
effect of disturbing industrial peace is emphasized by this very case. The record
shows that the Employer and the Intervenor have enjoyed harmonious industrial
relations since the Intervenor was certified as the representative of the Employer's
employees more than 5 years ago."
108 N.L.R.B. at 1287. In Nash Kelvinator the Board stressed similar factors. 110 N.L.R.B.
at 449.
37. Central Rufina, 108 N.L.R.B. 307 (1954) (automatic renewal contract); 3. C.
Hirschman Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 529 (1953) (same) ; Mill B, Inc., 40 N.L.R.B. 346 (1942)
(same) ; General Elec. Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1290 (1954) (contract with broad renogiation
clause).
38. See, e.g., Ketchikan Pulp Co., LAB. REL. REP. (37 L.R.RM. 1287) (NLRB Jan.
31, 1956).
39. Automatic renewal contracts, contracts with broad renegotiation clauses, and
terminable-at-will contracts are virtually interchangeable. All allow for revision of the
terms of the contract. Terminable contracts differ from the others in that modifications
may be discussed at any time. Automatic renewal contracts and contracts with broad re-
negotiation clauses permit revision only at stated intervals. However, it is an unfair labor
practice to terminate any contract, including one terminable at will, without giving the
other party sixty-days notice. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1) (1952). From
the point of view of healthy labor relations, contracts with broad renegotiation clauses
are preferable, because they assure to the employer the continuation of the existing
seniority system and grievance procedure and at the same time they preserve the workers'
right to seek higher wages. For further discussion of the various types of agreements,
see BNA, CoLLE TIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 36:1-543 (1956).
40. See dissenting opinions of Murdock and Peterson in Ketchikan Pulp Co., LAB.
REL. R'. (37 L.R.R.M. 1287, 1290-92) (NLRB Jan. 31, 1956). Since contracts providing
for broad renegotiation allow unions to seek periodic wage increases, unions might be
willing to enter into them for long terms. If freedom of choice is to remain a basic
tenet of labor law, these contracts must not be allowed to bar for their full length.
41. Member Bean concurred in the decision of the Board in Ketchikan Pulp Co.,
supra note 40, directing an election. His reasoning, however, was not based on the fact
that the contract had a renegotiation clause but on the fact that the union had exercised
its right to modify the contract pursuant to the renegotiation clause. Apparently he would
advocate a different result if neither party sought modification. Id. at 1289-90.
42. See note 39 supra.
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gaining arrangement is the welcome product of recently acquired knowledge
on labor relations. In its infancy the National Labor Relations Board thought
that a collective bargaining agreement would, by itself, produce stability, since
an aggrieved party could turn to the courts for the enforcement of his con-
tractual rights.43 Thus, when a comprehensive contract, enforceable in court,
had been executed, no significant function remained for the bargaining repre-
sentative.44 At best the selection of a new representative was purposeless;
at worst it could result in subverting the agreement. Currently, however, labor
relations experts recognize that securing industrial peace requires a continu-
ing barter relationship: the collective bargaining agreement is the beginning
of the bargaining process, not the end.45 So viewed, the proven ability of a
union to effect compromise between workers and employer is a more mean-
ingful indicium of industrial peace than the enforceability and completeness
of a contract.
43. "Normally, [a collective bargaining agreement] . . is both means and proof of
the achievement of that stability which is an objective of the statute, for such an
agreement identifies the employees' recognized bargaining representative, settles
questions pertaining to wages, hours, and working conditions, and betokens the
successful operation of the collective bargaining process."
Container Corp. of America, 61 N.L.R.B. 823, 826 (1945) (dictum). The Supreme Court
and Congress also held the view that the signing of a written contract was the final step
in the bargaining process. See H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 524-25 (1941)
(dictum); H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1935).
However, judicial enforcement of collective agreements is not, and never was, free
irom difficulty. The view that such contracts were unenforceable, while orthodox once,
generally gave way soon after the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act. 1
TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLEcTivE BARGAINING § 163 (1940). But traditional re-
luctance to consider unincorporated associations jurisitic entities often places insuperable
procedural barriers to suits by or against unions. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 443-49 (1955). Taft-Hartley sought
to resolve the paradox of rights without remedies by providing a forum in which collec-
tive contracts could be enforced. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952). But
recently the Court cast doubt upon the constitutionality of this provision. Association
of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra at 449-59.
44. Cf. Superior Elec. Products Corp., 6 N.L.R.B. 19, 22 (1.938).
45. "But when the agreement is signed, the parties have just married and must still
go through life together. While a good collective agreement is perhaps more prom-
ising of a happy future than a good marriage contract, in either case the agreement
merely launches the mutual enterprise. The success of the enterprise depends
upon satisfactory adjustment of the conflicts and frictions in the day-to-day life
of the parties. Their collective bargaining and their negotiations begin with the
agreement and continue constantly thereafter."
Shulman, The Role of the Impartial Umpire, in BAKKE & KERR, UNIONS, MANAGEMENT
AND THE PUBLIc 485, 486 (1948). See also SHuLMAN, OPINIONS OF THE UMPIRE preface
(1946) ; Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999
(1955). Consistent with his belief that efficient and harmonious industrial relations can
be secured only by the honest and daily cooperation of the parties, Shulman took issue
with the wisdom of Taft-Hartley's provision for suits on collective bargaining agreements.
Id. at 1001-02, 1023-24. But see Cox, Rights under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv.
601, 604-05 (1956) (some judicial enforcement beneficial).
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Schism Exception
Like the certification year rule, the contract bar rule will not be applied
if the bargaining unit has changed in character,46 if the contracting union is
defunct,47 or if a schism produces two factions claiming adversely. 48 Until
1952 the latter exception allowed easy circumvention of the rule. Employees
could repudiate an unsatisfactory union by voting at a meeting of the local
to disaffiliate from the international, and either to affiliate with another inter-
national or to form an independent union. 49 The schism between local and
international was thought to create confusion as to which union was the
administrator of the contract, and it was feared that unless doubt as to the
identity of the contracting union was resolved by an election the grievance
machinery might be halted.50
This major escape from the contract bar rule is being narrowed. In 1952
the Board, to implement a policy against membership raiding by rival unions,
ruled that no elections would be allowed if another union had any part in the
46. General Motors Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. 841 (1955) (new operation) ; New Jersey
Natural Gas Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 251 (1952) (merger); General Elec. Co., 85 N.L.R.B.
150 (1949) (plant moved to a new location). But see The Budd Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 116
(1953) (increase in number employed and new assembly line process, but no election held) ;
Solar Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1188 (1954) (machine shop employees hired after contract
was executed, but no election held).
For policies underlying the changed unit exception, see note 16 supra.
47. A. 0. Smith Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1415 (1954) ; Dick Brothers, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B.
1054 (1954).
Since most unions are affiliated with an international, which can forestall the opera-
tion of the exception merely by appointing an administrator for the contract, the defunct
union exception is not of much practical significance. It has been applied to affiliatel
unions six times since the narrowing of the schism exception in 1952. Each case pre-
sented special circumstances. C & .D Batteries, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1405 (1954) (Com-
munist dominated union) ; Benjamin Air Rifle, 107 N.L.R.B. 104 (1953) (same) ; South
Fork Foundry and Mach. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 980 (1953) (same); Ordill Foundry &
Mfg. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 412 (1952) (international had not appointed an administrator) :
Prairie Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 829 (1953) (international had executed coatract whenl
local was defunct and without consulting employees); Thomas L. Green & Co., 103
N.L.R.B. 1023 (1953) (international had refused to sign the contract).
48. See notes 49 and 50 infra.
49. In early cases the Board would hold an election whenever a substantial doubt
existed as to which labor organization was the party to the contract, Kay and Ess Co.,
48 N.L.R.B. 1387 (1943), or when substantially all the membership had repudiated the
union, Gelatin Products Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 173 (1943). Later the criterion was merely
whether the schism had caused such confusion that the contract could no longer promote
stability. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 1125 (1951) ; Harrisburg Ry., 94 N.L.R.B.
1028 (1951); Boston fach. Works Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 59 (1950). This extension made
possible an election even where one union was clearly the signatory to the contract. But
there were always limitations on the schism doctrine. The meeting at which disaffiliation
was voted had to have some semblance of democracy. Lewittes & Sons, 96 N.L.R.B. 775
(1951) (no election held, because the vote did not express the desires of the memberhil)
of the union). And the disaffiliation had to be as broad as the unit covercd by the contract.
Harris Products Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 812 (1951).
50. See Boston Mach. Works Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 59, 60 (1950).
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disaffiliation movement.r l This condition substantially reduced the number
of cases in which the exception was applied.52 Moreover, since 1952 the Board
has found that confusion over which union was bargaining agent existed
only where the disaffiliation was prompted by the expulsion of the international
from its federation 53 or was part of a movement by many locals to disaffiliate.r 4
A more forthright jettisoning of the schism exception may be near. In a
recent case the Board implied that an election would be allowed only if the
contracting international was unable to administer the agreement.55 The ab-
sorption of the schism exception by the defunct union exception would cul-
minate the trend toward increasing restrictions on free choice.
THE RULES AND THEIR PURPOSE-AN APPRAISAL
The restrictions on freedom of choice imposed by the certification year,
election year and contract bar rules place a representative beyond the control
of the represented. For the internal democratic structure of a union provides
little assurance that dissatisfaction with its policies can be effectively expressed
within the organization. 6 The political indifference of the rank and file pro-
duces small turnouts at meetings 5 7 and even if all members do attend, the
51. Saginaw Furniture Shops, 97 N.L.R.B. 1488 (1952).
52. The exception has been applied twenty times since 1952. In each case the Board
felt there were legitimate reasons for change. Thirteen cases involved schisms in alleged
Communist-dominated unions. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. 547 (1955);
Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. 533 (1955); The Magnavox Co., 111 N.L.R.B.
379 (1955). One case involved a split-off from an alleged corrupt union. San Juan Com-
mercial Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 599 (1955). In another case the international would not ad-
minister the agreement. American Factors, Ltd., 104 N.L.R.B. 199 (1953). Five cases
involved a dispute over internal management of the textile union. See, e.g., Franklin
Throwing Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 153 (1952); Wade Mfg. Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1135 (1952).
During this period the Board refused to apply the exception thirty-one times. See,
e.y., Muskin Mfg. Co., Lab. REL. REP. (37 L.R.R.M. 1155) (NLRB Dec. 7, 1955) ; Aleo
Xfgz. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1297 (1954); The Weatherhead Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 717 (1954).
53. See, e.g., The Magnavox Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 379 (1955) ; General Elec. Apparatus
& Serv. Shop, 110 N.L.R.B. 1054 (1954); A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 546
(1954).
54. See, e.g., Bryant Finishing Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 422 (1952) ; Franklin Throwing Co.,
101 N.L.R.B. 153 (1952); Wade Mfg. Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1135 (1952).
55. Muskin Mfg. Co., LAB. REL. REP. (37 L.R.R.M. 1155) (NLRB Dec. 7, 1955).
56. See Hoxie, The Leaders and the Rank and File, in BAKKE & Km, op. cit. supra
note 45, at 184.
Most unions are organized in accordance with democratic principles with provisions
for control by majority vote. E.g., Constitution of the AFL-CIO, BNA LABOR POLICY
AND PrCTxCEs 263:281, 283 (1956). In addition to providing for election of officers, most
union constitutions require membership ratification of contracts negotiated by the leaders.
CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 77 (1951).
57. Turnout is often small at meetings called to discuss such important matters as
whether to disaffiliate. See, e.g., Saginaw Furniture Shops, Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1488 (1952)
(30 present out of a membership of 220) ; Phoenix 'Mfg. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 803 (1952)
(45 present out of a membership of 148). See also REYNOLDS, LABOR EcoNoM-IcS AND
LABOR RELATIONS 139 (1949).
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majority of members can be considerably less than the majority of employees.6 8
Finally, lack of an experienced opposition slate often leaves workers with
no alternative but to keep unwanted officialsYn9
During the period of insulation from repudiation the union "is clothed with
power not unlike that of a legislature."6 Even after losing support of the
majority of employees unions can bind employees to a collective bargaining
agreement,6' retain practical control over the grievance procedure established
by the agreement,6 2 receive dues withheld from the employees by the em-
ployers, 63 and exercise the power to manage welfare plans, including dis-
cretion in investing the funds.6 4
58. Generally, all employees will be members of the union only if there is a union
shop contract. These contracts are valid unless in conflict with state laws. Cf. Railway
Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4251 (U.S. May 21, 1956). Forty-three
per cent of collective bargaining agreements contain union shop provisions. BNA Cor.L-C-
TIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 87:1-2 (1955).
59. Only the International Typographical Union has a fully developed party system.
REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 151 (1949). Moreover, the rule re-
quiring members of a labor organization to exhaust their remedies within the organization
before seeking judicial relief enhances the leader's hold on the organization. See Kelly
v. Incitti, LAB. REL. REP. (38 L.R.R.M. 2107) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 8, 1956) (union mem-
bers denied injunction preventing union from interfering with their right to be nominated
for office). For criticism of the exhaustion of remedies rule, see Comment, 65 YALE L.J.
369 (1956).
60. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944). The quote refers specific-
ally to unions selected under the Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45
U.S.C. § 151 (1952), but the powers conferred upon unions by that act are no broader
than those bestowed by the National Labor Relations Act. See Williams v. Yellow
Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 1952).
61. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 60 (1954) (by implication), 69 HARv. L. REv. 185-87
(1955).
62. Section 9(a) of the act gives individual employees the right to present grievances.
49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952). But this right is of little
practical significance. See Summers, Uniom Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MICH. L.
REv. 805, 814-15 (1951).
63. Withholding-or checkoff- of dues is permitted only when an employee executes
a written authorization. An authorization may be irrevocable for one year. 61 STAT. 157
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1952). Many contracts contain provisions regarding checkoff.
"About 10 percent of contracts provide that the employee may revoke his authoriza-
tion at any time. Another 25 percent provide that the authorization is to be irre-
vocable for one year or the term of the contract, whichever is shorter. . . . Other
checkoff provisions do not refer to revocability."
BNA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 87:661 (1955).
64. More than forty-five per cent of contracts contain employee-benefit provisions.
BNA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 44:1 (1955). In some
plans union and management have joint control over the administration of benefits. In
other plans joint control is exercised over the trust fund as well. Under the provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Act, benefits set up after 1946 may not be controlled exclusively
by a union. Nevertheless, in practice a few plans are administered predominantly by unions.
BNA CoLLEcTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 44:251, 551 (1955).
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Allowing a representative to exercise such extensive powers during a period
in which it is free from the control by the represented militates against demo-
cratic principles. At common law the possibility of an agent betraying his
principal's trust was checked by a general prohibition against irrevocable
agencies. 5 Similarly in corporate law stockholders are given the power to
remove corporate officers at any time for cause. G In government an elaborate
system of checks and balances guards against abuse. It would only be in keep-
ing with this general abhorrence of entrenched power to demand that re-
strictions on employee free choice be no broader than necessary to achieve
industrial stability.
The cases do not reveal whether the National Labor Relations Board sub-
scribes, even in the abstract, to this principle of limited restrictions on em-
ployee control. True, the Board generally does say that the imposition of a
bar is necessary for industrial stability.67 But support for this assertion is
found in the statements in previous cases rather than in a factual analysis of
the way stability actually results from the bar.08 Yet the proposition that
irrevocable bargaining agencies contribute to industrial peace is not self-evident.
Employees may strike even if they cannot repudiate their union ;G9 indeed the
inability to repudiate may be the cause of a strike.70 A conclusion that the
rules are or are not necessary to industrial stability may be drawn only
after examining the ways in which the rules can promote industrial harmony.
65. Even an agency stated to be irrevocable will not necessarily be so, since ordinarily
a contract not to revoke an agency is not specifically enforceable. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 167 (1950); MECHEM, AGENCY § 264 (4th ed. 1952). Only when agency powers are
coupled with an interest will an agency be irrevocable. Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adminis-
trators, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174 (1823); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 138, 139 (1933).
However, a bargaining agency does not consist of powers coupled with an interest. Con-
sequently, in states without labor laws abrogating common law agency doctrines, unions
may be repudiated by the employees at any time. Hill v. United Pub. Workers Union,
314 Ky. 791, 236 S.W.2d 887 (1950) ; Salzman v. United Retail Employees' Local 112,
10 Ohio Op. 6 (C.P. 1937).
66. Toledo Traction, L. & P. Co. v. Smith, 205 Fed. 643 (N.D. Ohio 1913); Koppitz-
Melchers, Inc. v. Koppitz, 351 Mich. 582, 24 N.W.2d 220 (1946); Markovitz v. Markovitz,
336 Pa. 145, 8 A.2d 46 (1939); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 185 (rev. ed. 1946); 2
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 351 (perm. ed. 1954).
67. See, e.g., Muskin Mfg. Co., LAB. REL. REP. (37 L.R.R.M. 1155, 1156) (NLRB
Dec. 7, 1955); General Motors Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1140, 1142-43 (1953); Reed Roller
Bit Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 927, 929-30 (1947).
68. See, e.g., Aleo Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1297, 1302 (1954) ; General Motors Corp.,
102 N.L.R.B. 1140, 1142-43 (1953); Dennis-Mitchell Industries, 101 N.L.R.B. 846, 848
(1952).
69. A good example is the recognition strike which followed the decision in Triboro
Coach Corp. v. New York Labor Board, 286 N.Y. 314, 36 N.E.2d 315 (1941), barring
repudiation of the contracting union. New York Times, Aug. 9, 1941, p. 17, col. 1.
70. The Board itself has recognized this in cases holding that a contract can bar for
only a reasonable time. See The Trailer Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 1106, 1111 (1943).
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Incubating the Collective Bargaining Agreement: the Certification and Election
Year Rules
The certification and election year rules can enhance industrial stability by
creating conditions favorable to the execution of a satisfactory collective bar-
gaining agreement. In the Board's view such conditions do not exist where
employees may be tempted to repudiate unions at the instigation of hostile
employers or rival unions.
71
Union rivalry may increase the demands of employees beyond the bounds
of reason. In soliciting for members the opposing union may make extrava-
gant promises. To maintain its status as bargaining representative the certified
union might have to compete, promise for promise.72 As the promises become
more nearly Utopian the likelihood of agreement with the employer would be-
come more remote.
In addition union rivalry could stall the bargaining process. It is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to bargain with a union pending an election.
Consequently, without the certification and election bar rules a union defeated
at a prior election could keep the victor from the bargaining table merely by
filing a petition for a new election.
Absent the rules, an employer might refuse to bargain with a union in the
hope that his obstinacy would cause the employees to desert the union. 4 Such
tactics would undoubtedly be an unfair labor practice and the employer
could be ordered to bargain with the union,75 but a refusal to bargain charge
71. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1954).
72. CHAMBERLAIN, COLLEcTIvE BARGAINING 245 (1951).
73. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945) (execution of contract
with majority union during pendency of election an unfair labor practice); NLRB v.
National Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525, 536 (2d Cir. 1954) (same); Alaska Salmon
Industry, Inc., 98 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1952) (same). But see NLRB v. Standard Steel
Spring Co., 180 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1950) (not an unfair labor practice to bargain with
a union designated by all employees during pendency of petition for election).
An employer need not refrain from bargaining with the incumbent union unless the
election petition filed by the rival union raises a valid question concerning representation.
William Penn Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1951) (petition seeking election
for an inappropriate bargaining unit will not halt bargaining). Since the Board will hold
an election only if the petitioning union can show the support of at least thirty per cent
of the workers, see note 23 supra, a rival union that does not meet this requisite cannot
stall the bargaining process.
74. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100 (1954). In Stanislaus Implement and Hard-
ware Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 394, 396 (1952), the Board found as evidence of the employer's
bad faith that he had said he would stall for a year and then have a decertification election.
Although an employer's refusal to bargain would most likely foster employee-union
cohesion, the opposite result might obtain if the bargaining unit had only recently-and
reluctantly-been organized.
75. 49 SWAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1952) ; Cambria Clay
Products Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 267 (1953); Stanislaus Implement and Hardware Co., 101
N.L.R.B. 394 (1952). Orders requiring the employer to bargain with the union are often
issued. E.g., Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
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is difficult to prove and may be evaded by well counseled employers.76 The
rules immunizing unions from repudiation provide a more certain deterrent
to attempts to dishearten employees.
Nevertheless, protecting certified unions from captious union rivalry and
employer hostility does not offer a justification for applying the rules under
all circumstances. The rules also bar repudiation inspired by genuine dissatis-
faction with the certified union; it matters not whether the repudiation move-
ment was prompted by union-employer collusion, union corruption or a failure
of the leaders to honor the constitution of the union.77 In some cases the diffi-
culty of determining whether the actual causes of a repudiation movement are
legitimate may justify applying the rule. But in other situations it may be
perfectly clear that a certified union's loss of majority support cannot be traced
to the capricious promises of a rival union or the dilatory tactics of a hostile
employer. 78 Indeed, with the amalgamation of the American Federation of Labor
and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, loss of majority support due to
extravagant promises of rival unions should be a rare occasion. 79 The Board
has ascertained whether employee discontent with unions was caused by the
obstreperous tactics of employers and the unfair charges of rival unions in
deciding whether to apply the schism exception. 0 Certainly there is no reason
why it can not do likewise in deciding whether the rules should apply at all.
It is true that permitting an election where the certified union is collusive,
76. Since the act does not compel employers to reach agreements with employees,
NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937), a refusal-to-bargain
charge turns wholly on the subjective question of whether an employer is acting in good faith
in refusing a union's demands. See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 682-85
(9th Cir. 1943). For examples of how unyielding employers may be without violating the
act, see NLRB v. United Clay Mines Corp., 219 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955) (employer
steadfastly insisted upon right to determine grievances unilaterally) ; NLRB v. National
Paper Co., 216 F.2d 859, 863-65 (5th Cir. 1954) (adamant refusal to discuss wage increase).
77. In the past such conduct has been the cause of repudiation movements. See, e.g.,
San Juan Commercial Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 599 (1955) (alleged corruption); Whirlpool
Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. 547 (1955) (Communist domination); NLRB v. Globe Automatic
Sprinkler Co., 199 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1952) (refusal to submit contract for membership
ratification in accordance with constitution); Franklin Throwing Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 153
(1952) (mismanagement).
78. See cases cited note 52 supra.
79. The AFL-CIO merger agreement contains a no-raiding provision. For its text
see 35 L.R.R.M. 80 (1955). Before the merger sixty-five AFL unions and twenty-nine
CIO unions had signed a no-raiding pact. See 34 L.R.R.M. 26 (1954).
80. In deciding whether to apply an exception to be contract bar rule the Board fre-
quently must determine whether a rival union has engaged in unlawful participation.
Roberts Brass Mfg. Co., LAB. REL. REP. (36 L.R.R.M. 1513) (NLRB Sept. 15, 1955);
Arthur C. Harvey Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 338 (1954); Dick Bros., Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1054
(1954). And in unfair labor practice cases there is often a determination whether a union's
loss of support was caused by the employer's unfair practices. NLRB v. Geigy Co., 211
F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954).
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corrupt or faithless would put the bargaining process at a standstill.8 1 But
these are the circumstances under which it is most dangerous to have bargain-
ing continue. For it is most unlikely that such a union could obtain an agree-
ment that would stabilize industrial relations. Indeed, the corrupt or collusive
union might sacrifice workers' interests in the agreement it obtained.8 2 And
the Board can always protect a certified union from groundless charges of
corruption by refusing to entertain a petition unless proof is substantial.
Furthermore, stability cannot justify denying an election in cases where
the Board has traditionally recognized an exception to the certification year
rule.83 The Board created these exceptions to avoid impasses in labor rela-
tions.84 Yet the election year rule, by placing a blanket restriction on the
holding of elections, has left the Board powerless to intervene. In doing so,
the rule sterilizes rather than nurtures labor relations.
Preserving the Collective Bargaining Agreement: The Contract Bar Rule
The purpose of the contract bar rule is to maintain the integrity of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.8 5 Harmony will be achieved only if the parties
to the agreement observe its provisions in good faith and utilize its grievance
procedure;80 this peace would be jeopardized if workers could select at will
a new union to represent them. The succeeding union might have gained its
support by promising workers a better contract,87 and following certification
this union might openly breach the old agreement or subvert it in subtler ways.
Nevertheless, the restrictions on free choice imposed by the contract bar rule
are broader than necessary to preserve the integrity of a collective bargaining
agreement. The rule bars change motivated by dissatisfaction with a union's
administration of the contract, 8 Protestations by the new union that it is will-
ing to abide by both the letter and the spirit of the agreement are of no avail.80
81. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
82. For case studies of sell-outs by corrupt union leaders, see Goodman, Muscling it
on Labor, New Republic, April 30, 1956, p. 8; May 14, 1956, p. 13; JoHnsoN, CRIME ON
THE LABOR FRONT passim (1950).
See 100 CONG. REc. 271 (1954) for description of a shut-down in the construction in-
dustry precipitated by an allegedly corrupt union.
83. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 16 supra.
85. See Container Corp. of America, 61 N.L.R.B. 823 (1945). "IT]he practice of
collective bargaining is, in general, best encouraged by leaving undisturbed the tripartite
relationships defined in trade agreements." Id. at 826.
86. SHULMAN, OPINIONS OF THE UMPIRE preface (1946) ; Ford Motor Co., Arbitration
Award, Opinion A-190 (May 15, 1945), in SHULMAN, Op. Cit. supra.
87. See, e.g., Barton Distilling, 106 N.L.R.B. 361 (1953) (union seeking election had
promised employees a better contract). See note 72 supra.
88. See, e.g., The Weatherhead Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 717 (1954) (cause of the disaffili-
ation was a dispute over the handling of grievances).
89. R. C. Williams & Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 933 (1954); The Budd Co., 107 N.L.R.B.
116, 121 (1953) ; Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 20 (1949) (rule applies,
but requisites of schism exception met).
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And elections have been denied where the employer states that he will accept
the new union as substitute for the contracting party. 0
REcOmMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In summary, the three rules unduly restrict a worker's freedom of choice.
The certification year and election year rules, intended to promote stability
by discouraging union rivalry and employer hostility, bar change in situations
where these disruptive forces are absent. The election year rule does not
admit of even the limited exceptions to which the certification year rule is
subject. Finally, the contract bar rule, designed to preserve the integrity of
contracts, bars change even though the new union is willing to adopt the agree-
ment.
Purposeless restrictions on the right to repudiate should not be tolerated. Ac-
cordingly, the certification and election year rule should be amended to permit
repudiation of a union where the party seeking the new election can show that
the repudiation movement was not inspired by employer hostility or unfair
methods of union rivalry.91 This burden should be considered met when there
is convincing proof of corruption, collusion with the employer or faithless-
ness to the union's constitution. The election year rule as well should be made
subject to the defunct union exception. Finally, the contract bar rule should
not be applied where the employer is willing to accept the new union as party
to the agreement, or the Board is convinced that the new union will abide by
the agreement. To insure adherence to the contract, the election could be ex-
pressly limited to determining which union should administer the contract, a
procedure used by the NLRB in the early days of the Wagner Act.92
90. In many schism cases the employer is neutral on the issue of whether the contract
should bar. See, e.g., Dick Bros., Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1054 (1954); Pepsi-Cola Buffalo
Bottling Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 990 (1954); R. C. Williams & Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 933 (1954).
91. There is precedent for such rules in state labor relations acts. Both the Wis-
consin and Minnesota statutes provide that an election can be held during the certifica-
tion year if good cause exists. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 179.16(2) (Supp. 1955) ; Wis. STAT.
§ 111.05 (1953).
92. The Register and Tribune Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 360 (1945); Barbison-Walker Re-
fractories Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 1349 (1942). See also New England Transp. Co., 1 N.L.R.B.
130 (1936) (practice before adoption of contract bar rule). The Board expressly repudiated
this practice in 1950 on the theory that it was not its function to suggest the legal con-
sequences of certification. Boston Mach. Works Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 59 (1950). As a result
directions for elections during the life of a contract no longer contain limitations. Ibid.
An amendment requiring the Board to condition its certifications on the acceptance
of the terms of an outstanding contract was rejected in conference by the House. H.R.
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947). Drawing a negative inference from
this, the Board has ruled that is is powerless to issue conditional certifications. Boston
Mach. Works Co., supra. But the Board's interpretation of congressional intent from
failure to pass the amendment is not persuasive. The committee indicated that the
amendment was withdrawn solely to avoid creating the impression "that the practice of
the Board with respect to conducting representation elections while collective bargaining
contracts are in effect should not be continued." H.R. R.'. No. 510, supra.
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Authority of the Board to Make the Changes
The Board does not have full authority to make these changes. Only Con-
gress can amend the election year rule. And the courts have the final say
whether a union may succeed to the contractual rights and duties of its prede-
cessor. Pending amendment of the election year rule, however, the Board
may grant employees relief from the powers of unwanted unions. The Board
could revoke the certification of unions which have lost majority support for
reasons not associated with union rivalry or employer hostility. Revocation
has been used on occasion and appears to be within the power of the Board.-
Once the certification of a union is revoked, the employees would be free to
bargain individually or collectively with the employer . 4 But they would still
not be able to elect a new union during the election year.95
The Board's ability to liberalize the contract bar rule is entirely dependent
upon the cooperation of the courts, for actions on contracts are within the
jurisdiction of the courts, not the Board.9 6 The reaction of courts to a Board
certification conditioned upon acceptance of a contract may be assayed from
state cases dealing with change of union during the life of an agreement. There
a formidable body of contract doctrine holds that the signatory union remains
entitled to the rights and bound by the obligations of the contract.97 Thus
even after a new union has been selected, courts have allowed the contracting
union to administer trust funds,98 maintain a closed shop,99 and receive union
dues withheld by the employer.100 Conversely, new unions have been denied
the right to enforce the collective bargaining agreement. 101
These cases rest on narrow notions of privity. The signatory union is con-
sidered the real party to the contract.'0 2 Therefore unless the contracting union
consents, a new union cannot be substituted in its place.' 0° But even assuming
that the requisite of privity must be met to enforce a collective bargaining agree-
93. Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953), 54 COLUm. L. REV. 135 (1954), 67
H~Auv. L. Rv. 522 (1954) (certification revoked conditionally for union's discrimination
against non-members).
94. Upon revocation individual bargaining would prevail. If the employees should
thereafter informally designate a new union by clear majority, the employer would be
under a duty to bargain, since that duty is not conditioned upon an election and certifi-
cation. NLRB v. Kobritz, 193 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1951).
95. See note 17 supra.
96. Boston Mach. Works Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 59 (1950).
97. See Comment, 51 YALE L.J. 465, 472-75 (1942).
98. Suffridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
99. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Red Star Shoe Repairing Co., 2 L.R.R.M.
882 (Pa. C.P. 1938).
100. Local 60, Industrial Union of Marine Workers, CIO v. Welin Davit and Boat
Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 551, 33 A.2d 708 (Ch. 1943).
101. Morrison v. Majestic Laundry System, Inc., 103 N.Y.S2d 791, 799 (Sup. Ct.
1951).
102. See also Comment, 51 YALE L.J. 465, 472-75 (1942).
103. A novation requires consent of the original parties. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACtS
§§ 424, 429 (1932).
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ment, this conclusion need not follow. The members of the bargaining unit,
rather than the contracting union, could be considered party to the contract.
10 4
So viewed, the status of the contracting representative would be assimilated
to that of an agent, and each succeeding union would be allowed to enforce
the rights and forced to carry out the duties of the employees under the agree-
ment. However, a more realistic approach would be to consider collective
bargaining agreements sui generis and allow substitution, not because contract
doctrine can be strained to permit it, but because a well-balanced labor policy
demands it.1° 5
Restrictive state court decisions need not defeat the Board's efforts to sub-
stitute new parties to contracts. For the effect of a Board certification on an
104. In A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 Fed. 225, 228-29 (6th Cir. 1909), appellants'
theory that a collective agreement between an employers' association and a union was
in reality an agreement between each employer and his employees was used to sustain
diversity jurisdiction. For brief discussion of use of the theory to sustain substitution,
see Comment, 51 YALE L.J. 465, 471-72 (1942) ; Larson, The Labor Relations Acts-Their
Effect on Industrial Welfare, 36 MIcH. L. REv. 1237, 1254 (1938). For criticism of
this theory, see Wilcox, The Triboro Case-Mowitain or Molehill?, 56 HARV. L. REv.
576, 598 (1943) ; Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HARv. L. REA.
572, 593-95 (1931).
While Barnes is the only case viewing a collective agreement as a contract between the
workers and employer, several courts have held that the individualized rights under collective
agreements belong to the workers rather than to the union. See Association of Westing-
house Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954)
(union improper party to maintain suit for vacation pay, but if occasion arose could enforce,
inter alia, lockout, union shop and arbitration provisions), aff'd, 348 U.S. 437 (1955) (but
theory expressly rejected by majority of Court) ; Federation of Westinghouse Independ-
Fnt Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse Corp., LAB. REL. REP. (38 L.R.R.M. 2234) (Pa. C.P.
Feb. 17, 1956) (employees and union may join in spurious class suit for overtime pay,
the workers being entitled to actual damages, and the union, nominal damages). Under
a compartmentalized view of collective bargaining agreements, substitution of a new
union to a contract is of significance only with respect to those provisions enforceable
by or against the union.
105. "The principles determining legal rights and duties under a collective bargaining
agreement should not be imposed from above; they should be drawn out of the institutions
of labor relations and shaped to their needs." Cox, Rights under a Labor Agreement, 69
H.xwv. L. REy. 601, 605 (1956). Several other distinguished scholars have suggested
treating collective contracts sni gencris. See Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor
Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999 (1955) ; Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the
Courts, 48 YALE L.J. 195 (1938).
Substitution will be facilitated if the agreement provides that it will bind the union's
-uccessor!-. See Agreement between Bendix Aviation Corp., Scintilla Magneto Div., and
M[achilists-A.F.L., BNA, COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 70:181-82
(1955). Although orthodox contract doctrine does not allow a contracting union to impose
duties upon a union ousting it as representative of the workers, one court has given
effect to such a provision. Louisville Ry. v. Louisville Area Transp. Workers Union, 312
Ky. 657, 228 S.W.2d 652 (1950). Another has suggested it. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Grand
Ludge Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 216 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1954). If, on the other hand, a
contract expressly states that it will cease to be binding if another union is certified,
the contract does not bar an election. Willys Overland Motors, Inc., 35 N.L.R.B. 549
(1941).
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existing contract is a federal question, the answer to which lies in the policy
of the act, and not in the contract rules of the forum.10 6 And the Board has




Employees can be granted greater freedom to switch bargaining representa-
tives without increasing industrial unrest. This Comment has suggested three
changes in the bar rules that will maximize employee freedom of choice and
industrial peace. It may be, however, that the period has passed in which
employer hostility and union rivalry are sufficient threats to industrial har-
mony to require any abridgment of workers' rights to bargaining representation
of their own choosing. This is a question of fact that should be reappraised
periodically. Labor relations is too dynamic a subject for the Board or Con-
gress to rely solely on precedent.
106. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Grand Lodge Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 105. But sce
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United Office & Professional Workers, 93 F. Supp.
296 (D.N.J. 1950) (contractual rights of union ousted without NLRB election governed
by state law). Moreover, several courts have held that § 301 of Taft-Hartley, 61 STAT.
156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952), makes federal law determinative of all questions arising out
of collective bargaining contracts in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Local 866, United
Automobile Workers, CIO v. Buffalo-Springfield Roller Co., 131 F. Supp. 667, 668 (S.D.
Ohio 1954) ; International Plainfield Motor Co. v. Local 343, United Automobile Workers,
CIO, 123 F. Supp. 683, 692 (D.N.J. 1954). But see Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 452-58 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.;
dictum).
107. See, e.g., Local 420, United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
Industry v. Carrier Corp., 130 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (finding that a contract clause
was illegal was based on Board's interpretation of the act).
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